New documents released Thursday reveal that ‘confusion and chaos’ reigned in the company’s Renton factory that built two 737 MAX planes that later crashed, killing 346 people in 2018 and 2019, the Seattle Times reports.
According to a prominent whistleblower Ed Pierson, production issues from back then still affect MAX planes flying today. The new documents reveal multiple electrical issues that were discovered as Boeing assembled the Ethiopian Airlines jet that crashed in 2019.
The Times notes that in 2018, the FAA found that employees in another Boeing facility in Everett, WA – where electrical components for integration – had been pushed to move to fast, and produced defective pieces.
Communications between Boeing and Ethiopian Airlines show the plane that later crashed experienced an in-flight safety incident months before the fatal accident. Boeing told the airline that the December 2018 incident was likely the result of an electrical error, the records show.
The whistleblower, Pierson, said the records and the earlier safety incident bolster his view that the deadly crash of the Ethiopian jet may have been initiated by an electrical problem. That problem traces back to production issues with electrical wire bundles that Pierson has highlighted.
Pierson, who worked at Boeing for more than a decade and served as a senior manager coordinating fixes for assembly problems on the 737 program, released the new documents through an advocacy group he formed after the crashes, the Foundation for Aviation Safety – and said that Boeing withheld the documents from regulatory investigators looking into the two deadly crashes.
Following the deadly incidents, he repeatedly alleged that manufacturing defects played a role.
The FAA, NTSB, and international regulators are in disagreement over the cause.
In both crashes, an error with then-new software — the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System or MCAS — caused the plane to nosedive. Boeing recently pleaded guilty to misleading safety regulators about MCAS and how much training pilots would need to fly safely.
In the case of the Ethiopian crash, the NTSB and its French counterpart concluded that it wasn’t an electrical error but a bird strike damaging a sensor that likely triggered the MCAS software.
The U.S. agency disputed a report from Ethiopian authorities that said the sensor was triggered by “production quality defects.”
Pierson sent the newly disclosed records to the NTSB, the FAA and the Department of Justice in July, he said.
Meanwhile, the FAA and NTSB are playing hot potato over the new documents, and have suggested that questions should be directed to Ethiopian authorities.
Boeing, in a statement, said that it “fully cooperated and provided relevant information to the investigation” regarding the Ethiopian Airlines flight 302 crash, adding “We defer to the investigative agencies for further information.”
The new documents also reveal that from communications between Boeing and Ethiopian Airlines, in December 2018, the airline’s 737 MAX experienced an “uncommanded roll”—a situation where the plane rolls unexpectedly, potentially disorienting the pilot and risking loss of control. This incident occurred just weeks after Ethiopian Airlines took delivery of the aircraft, and only a few months before it tragically crashed, killing all onboard.
Boeing’s communication with the airline at the time indicated that the uncommanded roll was likely caused by an electrical fault. The company advised Ethiopian Airlines to inspect the plane’s wiring for issues, raising questions about the broader electrical integrity of the 737 MAX fleet.
Further complicating matters, the Foundation for Aviation Safety released a copy of Boeing’s Shipside Action Tracker from the 2018 production of the ill-fated Ethiopian Airlines plane. This internal database, used by Boeing to document and resolve issues during aircraft assembly, revealed a series of misinstalled and mislabeled electrical components. The records also pointed to significant miscommunication among Boeing employees regarding the work performed on the aircraft.
In a separate but related matter, a 2018 Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) investigation into Boeing’s Electrical Systems Responsibility Center in Everett, Washington, uncovered additional issues – which include Boeing management having imposed stringent time limits on employees, potentially leading to defective parts passing through the electrical center without proper inspection. Notably, the report highlighted that some parts had only one minute allocated for pre-inspection.
The investigation also criticized Boeing’s “rework” process—where components are disassembled and fixed before being reassembled—pointing out that this critical step was not always verified by quality assurance teams.
The new report reinforces the confusion and disarray reported at Boeing’s Renton factory following a separate incident in January – in which workers failed to secure a panel properly after removing it for repairs, leading to the panel blowing off a 737 MAX mid-flight at 16,000 feet. Boeing later admitted that it had no documented record of the work and rework performed on the panel.
“In the case of the Ethiopian crash, the NTSB and its French counterpart concluded that it wasn’t an electrical error but a bird strike damaging a sensor that likely triggered the MCAS software”.
This is nothing less than (insultingly) blatant, pure speculation. The black box of the Ethiopian crash confirmed it at 30K+ feet at the origin of the MCAS systems’ departure from normal function. Sorry, but birds don’t fly that high.
FACT(S): After the 2nd crash in October 2018, of the Indonesian Airlines 737 Max w/ 188 souls on board, (which crashed into the Indian Ocean at 450 mph), Boeing immediately implied pilot error or a possible anomaly in maintenance procedures which was found and corrected. However, the investigation afterwards found the problem was in the design of the aircraft. Because the newly designed engines were larger, they needed to be positioned in a more forward stance on the wings. In the air, (under certain maneuvers), this positioning could change the handling of the jet, pitching it higher than pilots would expect. Boeing countered the problem w/ software. The program called MCAS, (Maneuvering Characteristic Augmentation System), designed and implemented to automatically push the nose of the plane down if a sensor detected the plane was pointing at too high of an angle.
However, (and unfortunately), Boeing made the critically wrong decision to have this software triggered by only one vane sensor, (read: NO redundancy), making it vulnerable to ‘single-mode failure’. To make matters worse, the vane sensor, (when activated), was designed to go to the full, nose-down position – it had NO limit switches.
The icing on the cake? Because the MCAS system was new software, it meant Boeing would have to spend millions in the form of pilot training and manual publications. So, to absorb any costs associated, Boeing simply concealed any/all evidence of the MCAS system. Pilots weren’t even aware of its existence because there wasn’t even a mention found in the operational flight manual.
After the first crash, Boeing informed American Airlines about MCAS, stating the MCAS ‘misbehaved’.
Sidenote: A software ‘misbehaved’. Seriously?! Boeing was talking as if they were dealing w/ a child. This was a software beast w/ NO redundancy, and which pilots knew nothing about…and when it ‘misbehaved’, there was nothing but terrifying havoc in the cockpit.
The insult on top of injury: Boing Aftermath – July 2024:
Federal prosecutors gave Boeing the choice to either enter a guilty plea and pay a fine, or face a trial. Boeing will plead guilty to a criminal charge of defrauding the U.S. government over the deadly 2018 and 2019 737 Max crashes that killed 346 people. The DOJ first charged Boeing with defrauding the U.S. government on Jan. 7, 2021, after the two crashes of its 737 Max 8 airplane. In a deferred prosecution agreement, the DOJ gave the company three years, until Jan. 7, 2024, to comply with new safety obligations in order to avoid charges.
On Jan. 5, just two days before the deferred prosecution agreement would have expired, the Alaska Airlines door panel on a Boeing 737 Max 9 blew off, midair. The DOJ ruled on May 14 that the incident put Boeing in violation of the 2021 deal, and said it would announce by July 7 how to proceed. Boeing denied breaching the agreement. That’s when prosecutors gave Boeing the choice to plead guilty and pay a fine or face a trial on felony charges of defrauding the U.S. government and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) by hiding the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) from federal regulators before the 737 Max crashes.
A federal judge has to approve the plea deal for it to take effect, but the deal calls for Boeing to pay an additional $243.6 million fine, (the same penalty that it paid in 2021 as part of the original prosecution agreement), making the total Boeing has paid to date – $2.5 BILLION to avoid criminal prosecution, which included $500 million for the families of the 737 Max crash victims. Boeing will also have to invest at least $455 million in safety and compliance programs and undergo three years of independent monitoring of its safety and quality control.
The new plea deal will shield Boeing only from any wrongdoing before the 737 Max crashes in 2018 and 2019, but will not give it immunity for any other incidents, including the Alaska Airlines incident. The plea deal covers only the corporation, not any current or former Boeing employees. Lawyers for some of the families of the 737 Max crash victims have said they will urge the judge to reject the plea agreement.
Personal Sidenote: This sweetheart deal fails to recognize that because of Boeing’s conspiracy, 346 people died. Through crafty lawyering between Boeing and the DOJ, the deadly consequences of Boeing’s crime are being hidden. In essence, Boeing is (literally) buying its way out, (w/ everyone involved having their hand out), and then writing the entire court case off as a ‘business loss’ expense and will (most likely) get much of that fine money back when tax time comes at the end of the year. (Read: A TOTAL miscarriage of justice).
Any DEI hires work on that electrical wiring